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Victim Participation and Lex Talionis':
Constitutionality Under Section 18 of
the Indiana Bill of Rights
You Satan, Jeffrey, I hate you motherf--, I hate you!2
I. INTRODUCTION
Victim participation3 in the criminal justice system allows the victim4 to
play a role in decisions concerning both the prosecution and sentencing of the
defendant.' The upsurge of victim participation can be seen as a response to
the widely held notion that the criminal justice system protects the rights of the
accused at the expense of the victim.' As a result of this movement, a
1. "The law of retaliation; which requires the infliction upon a wrongdoer of the same injury
which he has caused to another.... [A]n eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth .... " BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 913 (6th ed. 1990). See also Exodus 21:24, a biblical passage that is the most general
definition of the retributive theory of punishment.
2. Rita Isbell, the sister of one of Jeffrey Dahmer's victims, screamed this statement at a
sentencing hearing and simultaneously lunged at the defendant. Karen S. Schneider & Civia
Tamarkin, Day of Reckoning, PEOPLE, Mar. 2, 1992, at 38. This statement is representative of
many statements made under current victim participation statutes. More importantly, however, this
statement is an exact illustration of the retributive and vindictive motives behind such statements,
motives that run afoul of § 18 of the Indiana Bill of Rights. See infra notes 155-68 and
accompanying text.
3. The term 'victim participation' will be used to describe both victim impact statements (VIS's)
and victim statements of opinion (VSO's). See infra notes 14-20 and accompanying text for a
complete definition of each of these components.
4. A victim under a victim participation provision may be either the actual crime victim or the
victim's family members. However, this note will constrain itself to addressing the constitutionality
of victim participation in capital sentencing proceedings. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(a) (Burns
1992) (providing that "[t]he State may seek the death sentence for murder . . . ."). As capital
punishment may only be imposed for murder under certain aggravating conditions, the participating
victim will necessarily be a family member.
5. For a general discussion charting the evolution and successes of the victim's movement, see
Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 942 (1985).
6. In 1982, the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime postulated: "[Victims] have
learned that . . . the system has lost track of the simple truth that it is supposed to be fair and to
protect those that obey the law while punishing those who break it. Somewhere along the way, the
system began to serve lawyers and judges and defendants, treating the victim with institutionalized
disinterest." OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE
ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT vi (1982) [hereinafter TASK FORCE]. For the view that the
criminal justice system has disregarded the rights of the victim, as told by a former crime victim,
see Betty Jane Spencer, A Crime Victim's Views on a Constitutional Amendment for Victims, 34
WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1987). Mrs. Spencer survived a murder attempt and watched as her four sons
were slain. She is the Executive Director of the Protect the Innocent Victim's Advocate Foundation
and is a strong advocate for a federal constitutional amendment to protect the victim's rights and
733
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proliferation of victim's rights legislation has been enacted in the United States
within the past decade.7 As of 1988, forty-six states and the District of
Columbia had provided for victim input either through constitutional provisions
in their respective bills of rights," legislative enactments, 9 or both."0
In addition to the plethora of state provisions, the federal system also
provides for victim input at various stages of the process." The most
significant change occurred when Congress amended Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32 through the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 to require
the inclusion in the pre-sentence report of a statement of the crime's impact
upon the victim. 2 Today, the victim's rights movement continues to lobby at
the national level for a federal constitutional amendment to safeguard rights of
the victim.'
3
place them on equal footing with those of the accused.
7. As of 1982, only 12 states had provisions specifically guaranteeing the rights of the victim.
In a scant six years, this number grew to 46 states and the District of Columbia. NATIONAL
ORGANIZATION FOR VICTIM'S ASSISTANCE, VICTIM'S RIGHTS AND SERVICES: A LEGISLATIVE
DIRECTORY 10 (1988) [hereinafter NOVA LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY].
8. As of 1988, 21 states had specific constitutional provisions guaranteeing victim's rights:
California, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. NOVA LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY, supra note
7, at 10.
9. As of 1988, 14 states and the District of Columbia provided for victim input legislation:
Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
10. Asof 1988, 11 states provided for victim's rights through both constitutional provisions and
legislative enactments: Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Maryland, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, and Utah. Id.
11. The note at 18 U.S.C. § 1512 provides that the attorney general must set up guidelines
concerning when the victim must be notified of critical proceedings, the extent of communication
and input the victim is to have with the district attorney, and the ability of the victim to make a
victim impact statement at trial. For a discussion of the Victim & Witness Protection Act of 1982,
see Amy K. Posner, Victim Impact Statements and Restitution: Making the Punishment Fit the
Crime, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 301 (1984).
12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c) required that the pre-sentence report contain information regarding
the "financial, social, psychological, and medical impact upon. . . any individual against whom the
offense was committed." FED. R. CRIM P. 32(C)(2)(C) as amended by VICTIM & WITNESS
PROTECTION ACT OF 1982, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-15, 3146, 3663-64 (1982). Such reports are usually
referred to as victim impact statements (VIS's). The rule was amended and later codified at FED.
R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(D) to require the same statement as above but that it must be "verified" and
presented in a "nonargumentative" fashion. Id.
13. The President's Task Force on Victims of Crime suggested that an addition be made to the
Sixth Amendment to protect victims rights. The Sixth Amendment would become:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed; which district shall have previously been ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
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Victim participation, by either the victims or their representatives, can be
divided into two categories: Victim Impact Statements (VIS's) and Victim
Statements of Opinion (VSO's). Generally, a VIS includes a list of specific
economic losses, identification of physical or psychological injuries and their
seriousness, and changes in the victim's work or family status resulting from the
offense. 4 A VSO, on the other hand, is the victim's opinion regarding the
crime and the sentence. 5 The latter is still constitutionally impermissible; 6
however, the two types of statements can rarely be neatly distinguished from
each other, and courts appear to routinely receive a combination of the two.
Hence, this Note will examine the implications of both the VIS and the VSO.
Both types of statements can be presented to the court by more than one
party and by more than one means. 7 The victim participation provision may
provide for the presentation of either a VIS or a VSO by the prosecutor, by the
Department of Probation and Parole, by the victims themselves, or, in the case
of a homicide, by the victim's representative." Additionally, under some
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the assistance of counsel for his defence. Likewise, the victim, shall have the right
to be present and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings.
TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 114 (emphasis added). Additionally, several victim's rights groups
formed the Victim's Constitutional Amendment Network (Victims CAN) to focus on the enactment
of state constitutional amendments. Id. For a listing of the founding organizations, see Spencer,
supra note 6, at 5-6.
14. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, VICTIM/WITNESS LEGISLATION 46 (1991), quoted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2518.
15. Presently, VSO's are unconstitutional after Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987); see
infra notes 51-71 and accompanying text. However, it appears that the last vestiges of Booth will
fall given the Supreme Court's treatment of VIS's in Payne v. Tennessee, 11l S. Ct. 2597 (1991)
(partially overruling Booth), as soon as the proper case comes before the Court. The Court
specifically noted that because VSO information was not used in Payne and was not the subject of
the appeal, the constitutionality of such statements could not be decided. Id. at 2611 n.2. Hence,
part of Booth's holding remains for the time being. Indiana permits VSO's in non-capital cases; see
IND. CODE, § 35-38-1-8(b) (1992). See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
16. Payne, Il1 S. Ct. at 2611 n.2. In the sentencing phase of a capital case, a victim's
characterizations and opinions of the crime and the defendant are constitutionally impermissible
under the Eighth Amendment as announced in Booth.
17. However, in many jurisdictions, cumulative evidence may be excluded in the court's
discretion and thus the state might not be able to admit multiple presentations of the victim evidence.
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded.., by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.").
18. Indiana allows all three modes of presentation. The prosecutor may-and, indeed, is
expected to-prepare a VIS as it is not legislatively prohibited. Telephone Interview with Richard
Good, Executive Director of the Prosecuting Attorney's Council of Indiana (January 3, 1992)
[hereinafter Good Interview]. The probation officer must prepare a VIS to be included in the pre-
sentence report. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-8.5 (West Supp. 1991). Also, a victim's statement
may be made to the probation officer as part of a pre-sentence investigation under IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-38-1-9(c)(3) (West Supp. 1991); to a prosecutor to be included in the pre-sentence report under
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provisions, the statements may be presented in either oral or written form by
any of the parties discussed above. 9
The person presenting the statement may enhance the impact that the
evidence has upon the sentencing body. An emotional address to a jury by the
victim or her family would most likely have a greater impact than a written
statement by the probation department that a judge reads in camera. Thus, the
varying impacts that each permutation may have; either properly or improper-
ly,' must factor into the equation used when devising or examining a state's
victim participation provision.
Indiana has not yet enacted a constitutional provision guaranteeing victims'
rights, but it has passed three related pieces of legislation in this area.21 These
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-9(c)(2) (West Supp. 1991); or directly to the court at the sentencing
hearing under IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-8 (West Supp. 1991). See infra note 21 for the text of
these provisions.
19. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609 (1986).
20. The evidence, if used properly, will help the sentencing body determine whether or not the
convicted defendant should be sentenced to death. Improperly used, the evidence may affect the
emotions of the trier of fact in such a way that the trier will not render a rational or objective
decision and the defendant will be unfairly prejudiced. See infra note 53, which summarizes the VIS
used in Booth v. Maryland; discussed infra notes 51-71. The victim's daughter said that the
defendant could "[n]ever be rehabilitated" and that she could "never forgive" the defendant. The
son made other emotionally charged statements. It should appear that such statements play on the
jury's emotions rather than providing information for an informed and objective decision.
21. The Indiana victim participation statutes read as follows:
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-8 (West Supp. 1991):
(b) A victim present at a sentencing in a felony or misdemeanor case shall be advised by the
court of a victim's right to make a statement concerning the crime and the sentence [note that
this includes both a VIS and a VSO].
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-8.5 (West Supp. 1991):
(d) The probation officer shall prepare a victim impact statement for inclusion in the convicted
person's pre-sentence report. The victim impact statement consists of information about each
victim and the consequences suffered by a victim or a victim's family as a result of the crime.
(e) Unless the probation officer certifies that a victim . . . could not be contacted or elected
not to make a statement . . . . the victim impact statement must include the following
information about each victim:
(1) A summary of the financial, emotional, and physical effects of the crime on the
victim and the victim's family.
(2) Personal information concerning the victim, excluding telephone numbers, place of
employment, and residential address.
(3) Any written statements submitted by a victim or a victim representative to the
probation officer.
(4) If the victim desires restitution, the basis and amount of a request for victim
restitution.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-9 (West Supp. 1991):
(c) The presentence investigation may include any matter that the probation officer . . .
believes is relevant to the question of sentence and must include:
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 3 [1993], Art. 8
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statutes provide for both VIS's' and VSO's' under certain circumstances.
Indiana Code section 35-38-1-8 allows a victim present at a non-capital
sentencing to make a VSO.' Indiana Code section 35-38-1-8.5 mandates that
a VIS prepared by the probation officer must accompany every pre-sentence
report.' Additionally, prosecutors can question a victim's relatives at the
death penalty phase of a capital trial, or make oral statements in closing
arguments concerning the impact on the victim in non-capital trials.'
In formulating these statutes, however, the Indiana Legislature apparently
overlooked a provision of the Indiana Bill of Rights. Article I, section 18 of the
Indiana Constitution mandates that "[t]he penal code shall be founded on the
principles of reformation and not of vindictive justice."27 This provision
instructed the early legislature of the principles upon which the Indiana penal
code was to be founded. Section 18 should serve as a limit and a guide to the
current Indiana Legislature, mandating the justifications upon which new
criminal statutes may be based.' The legislature can only enact criminal
statutes that take into consideration the purposes delineated by this section, and
the Indiana Supreme Court is bound to strike down any legislation not following
(1) any matter the court directs to be included;
(2) any written statements submitted to the prosecuting attorney by a victim under IC
35-35-3;
(3) any written statements submitted to the probation officer by a victim; and
(4) except in cases where the death sentence is sought under IC 35-50-2-9, preparation
of the victim impact statement required under section 8.5 of this chapter.
In 1990, the Indiana legislature inserted § 35-38-1-9(c)(4) in response to the Court's holding in
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), discussed infra notes 51-71, that VIS use during the
sentencing phase of a capital case violates the Eighth Amendment. Good Interview, supra note 18.
It is important to note that while the inclusion of a VIS in a capital case is not required, it is not
legislatively prohibited. In fact, after Payne, Indiana prosecutors are expected to introduce such
evidence. Id. Thus, after Booth, there is no bar, either constitutionally or legislatively, against the
probation officer preparing a VIS in a capital case.
22. See supra note 21 for the text of the statute.
23. See supra note 21 for the text of the statute.
24. See supra note 21 for the text of the statute.
25. See supra note 21 for the text of the statute. In a case where the prosecutor seeks the death
penalty, the probation officer is not required to prepare a VIS. Id. However, the statute does not
prevent the officer from doing so, and after Payne every likelihood exists that a VIS will accompany
all pre-sentence reports, both capital and non-capital. Good Interview, supra note 18.
26. This may be subject to local evidentiary rules regarding relevancy, however. The U.S.
Supreme Court has found such evidence to be relevant. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597
(1991); see infra notes 85-99 and accompanyingtext. Also, before Booth was overruled, the Indiana
Supreme Court-reading Booth narrowly-had held that statements in a prosecutor's closing
argument concerning the victim impact were relevant when the defendant knew the victim prior to
the homicide. Woods v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1325 (Ind. 1990). See infra notes 104-07 and
accompanying text for a lengthier discussion of Woods.
27. IND. CONST. art. I, § 18 [hereinafter section 18 or § 18].
28. See infra notes 118-54 and accompanying text.
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its strictures.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court found that victim participation
statutes did not violate the federal Constitutior and were permissible under
the Eighth Amendment." However, the Supreme Court was not constrained
by the reformation provision found in section 18. This Note suggests that even
if the Indiana Supreme Court chose to apply the Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence to Indiana's analogue," and in the process uphold
the constitutionality of Indiana's victim input statutes,32 it still would be
compelled to find that the statutes are precluded by section 18. This is because
in a capital case, the participation of the victim at the sentencing phase is
inherently vindictive.33
The effect of such a finding would be to invalidate the use of Indiana's
victim participation statutes in a capital case. Under its bill of rights, Indiana
provides greater rights to criminal capital defendants than are found in the
federal Constitution.' Upon a showing that Indiana's statutes are vindictive
29. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), discussed infra notes 83-99.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." Id.
31. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 16. "Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not
be imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be
proportioned to the nature of the offense." Id. States are free to adopt the United States Supreme
Court interpretation of federal provisions in interpreting their analogous constitutional provisions or
may choose to interpret the sections on their own. For example, in Burress v. State, 363 N.E.2d
1036 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977), the court of appeals made the following statement: "Although this
precise question has never been answered in Indiana, it is well settled by the federal cases. Article
1, § 12 of the Indiana Constitution is analogous to the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Both guarantee a speedy trial." Id. at 1308.
In other cases, Indiana has chosen to grant a more expansive interpretation to its own
provision. See infra note 35. However, Indiana may not choose to offer a more narrow
interpretation of an analogous provision as the federal Constitution provides the minimum rights that
must be given. See infra notes 34, 117.
32. In Benirschke v. State, 577 N.E.2d 576 (Ind. 1992), the Indiana Supreme Court followed
the U.S. Supreme Court's lead as established by Payne v. Tennessee, affirming a murder conviction
on appeal over the defendant's objection that VIS's were improperly introduced. However, it does
not appear that the defendant argued that the victim impact statement violated either § 18 of the
Indiana Bill of Rights or art. I § 16; thus the question remains open. See infra notes 85-99.
33. This conclusion follows necessarily two premises central to this note. This note forwards
the following syllogism:
Premise 1: The Indiana Constitution prohibits retributive or vindictive statutes (see infra part
III);
Premise 2: Victim participation statutes are both retributive and vindictive (see infia part IV);
Therefore, the Indiana Constitution prohibits victim participation statutes (see infra part V).
34. As Justice Kauger of the Oklahoma Supreme Court notes, "[S]tates are free to grant their
citizens greater civil liberties and civil rights than those guaranteed by the federal government."
Yvonne Kauger, Reflections on Federalism: Protections Afforded by State Constitutions, 27 GONZ.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 3 [1993], Art. 8
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rather than reformative, the statutes must be either abandoned completely or
revised to protect the defendant's right to be tried under a penal code free of
constitutionally impermissible vindictiveness. Inaction by the Indiana courts or
the Indiana legislature would defeat both the purpose and spirit of section 18,
Indiana's reformation provision.
35
Section II of this Note will examine the current state of the law regarding
the use of victim participation statements at the sentencing phase' of a capital
case37 at both the federal and state levels.' Section III of this Note then
offers an interpretation of section 18 that is consonant with the text of the
provision39 and the framers' intent.' Discerning section 18's meaning will
necessarily entail an examination of both the convention history pertaining to this
L. REV. 1 (1991-92). Indeed, she notes, "[t]his double tier of protections is the true hallmark of
federalism." Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist, during his confirmation hearings, expressed the view that
the protections of the federal Constitution are the floor rather than a ceiling of an individual's rights.
Id. at 2.
35. This would not be the first time the Indiana Constitution was found to grant greater rights
than the federal Constitution. See Patrick Baude, Is There Independent Life in the Indiana
Constitution, 62 IND. L. J. 263, 268 (1987). Baude provides several examples. For instance, 38
years before Mapp v. Ohio required it, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the constitution dictated
the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, in Flum v. State, 141 N.E. 353, 354-55 (Ind. 1923).
Id. at 269. More recently, the Indiana Supreme Court held in Sims v. State, 413 N.E.2d 556, 560
(Ind. 1980), that a suspect in custody could not validly consent to a search unless specifically advised
of the right to counsel. The Supreme Court had found in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973), that under the Fourth Amendment, consent might be effective even absent being advised of
the right to counsel if found to be voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 269.
36. Death penalty cases are tried in bifurcated proceedings. First, the defendant's guilt or
innocence is determined. If the defendant is found guilty, the jury is reconvened for the sentencing
hearing to determine if the death penalty is appropriate under these circumstances. However, the
court is not bound by the jury's recommendation. IND. CODE ANN. 35-50-2-9 (West Supp. 1992).
37. This note will constrain itself to capital cases because in this situation, where only two
possible sentences can be imposed, death or life imprisonment, the appearance of vindictiveness is
much more pronounced. Unlike a restitutionary measure where the victim is asking to be restored
to her former position, the remedy available in a death penalty proceeding cannot place the victim
in her former position but can only take the life of the defendant. This decision is also guided by
the Supreme Court's determination that because death is a punishment different from all other
sanctions, the imposition of the penalty must be carefully scrutinized. Woodson v. South Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1974). Indeed, in Booth v. Maryland, the Court reasoned that while the victim
information might be relevant in other criminal and civil contexts, it could not "agree that it is
relevant in the unique circumstance of a capital sentencing hearing." 482 U.S. 496,504 (1987); see
infra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 47-117 and accompanying text.
39. Interpreting § 18 begins with examining the text of the provision, because the text of the
constitutional provision itself should provide the starting point for any state constitutional argument.
Robert E. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on
Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REV. 635, 654 (1987).
40. See infra notes 125-46 and accompanying text.
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section' and the early judicial interpretation given to it by the Indiana Supreme
Court. In Section IV,42 this Note explores the possible purposes served by
allowing victim participation in reference to the traditional goals of sentencing:
deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and retribution. 4' Finally, Section V
suggests that victim participation contravenes section 18. This Note concludes
that the Indiana courts must find that victim participation in capital sentencing
hearings is unconstitutional.' Such a holding would protect the capital
defendant's rights' and lead to a more enlightened view of penology under the
Indiana Constitution. Unfortunately, such a holding would also limit some of
the victim's rights.'
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW REGARDING VICTIM PARTICIPATION
A. Federal Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning the constitutionality of
victim participation at the sentencing phase of a capital case commenced with
Booth v. Maryland.47  A divided Court found the admission of a VIS at
sentencing to be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. 4  Two years
later, in South Carolina v. Gathers, the Court extended prohibition of the VIS
41. The Indiana Supreme Court has noted that it considers the constitutional convention debates
as an important tool in interpreting its constitution. See In re Todd, 193 N.E. 865 (Ind. 1935).
42. See infra notes 155-93 and accompanying text.
43. Congress identified these four classic purposes of sentencing in the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (Supp. 1986). No single justification can ever
determine the actual imposition of a criminal sanction, and at different times, different justifications
are in ascendancy. Henderson, supra note 5, at 987. While retribution is currently enjoying a
significant rebirth, see infra note 118, this note will attempt to demonstrate that at the time the
Indiana Constitution was drafted, reformation was the principle justification for punishment.
44. See infra part V.
45. It has been persuasively suggested and unsuccessfully argued that the death penalty itself
is violative of § 18. See Judy v. State, 416 N.E.2d 95 (Ind. 1981) (DeBruler, J., dissenting), for
such an argument. This note does not intend to make such an argument, in light of the long history
of Indiana cases that have upheld the death penalty under this provision even though capital
punishment appears to be inherently vindictive. See infra part IV.
46. As one commentator has noted, "liberals find themselves caught in yet another apparent
paradox: To be solicitous of a defendant's rights is to be anti-victim." Henderson, supra note 5,
at 952-53. However, Professor Henderson also notes that while victim's rights are increasingly
advocated, it is not clear that the reforms have anything to do with the victim or even whether they
are desirable. Id. at 953. It is difficult to advocate the rights of the defendant seemingly at the
expense of the victim. However, under the present VIS scheme in Indiana, the defendant's rights
under the Indiana Constitution are being abused. Indiana must either repeal the victim participation
statutes in capital cases as they are inconsistent with § 18, or it must amend the Indiana Constitution
and remove its reformation provision.
47. 482 U.S. 496 (1987). See infra notes 51-71 and accompanying text for a full discussion
of Booth.
48. Booth, 482 U.S. at 503.
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to include comments made by the prosecutor concerning personal characteristics
of the victim that were unknown to the defendant. 49 However, less than five
years after the Booth decision and less than three years after the Gathers
decision, a newly constituted Court held in Payne v. Tennessee that both Booth
and Gathers were incorrectly decided, and that the Eighth Amendment did not
prohibit the introduction of victim information in a capital case.' °
1. Booth v. Maryland
In Booth v. Maryland,"t the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the practice
of allowing the sentencing jury to consider a VIS prepared by the state Division
of Probation and Parole (DPP). 2 The Maryland statute mandating the VIS had
provided that the DPP prepare the statement solely from information supplied
by the victim's family.5" The statute also stated that, at the sentencing hearing,
49. 490 U.S. 805 (1989). See infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text for a full discussion
of Gathers.
50. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). See infra notes 84-98 and accompanying text for a full discussion
of Payne.
51. 482 U.S. 496 (1987). A jury convicted and sentenced Booth to death for the 1983 robbery
and murder of an elderly couple in their Baltimore home. The couple's son found the victims two
days after the killing, bound and gagged, with multiple wounds to their chests. Id. at 498.
52. The VIS was prepared pursuant to MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c) (1986). The statute
mandates that the report shall:
i. Identify the victim of the offense;
ii. Itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense;
iii. Identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of the offense along with
its seriousness and permanence;
iv. Describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as a result
of the offense;
v. Identify any request for psychological services initiated by the victim or the victim's
family as a result of the offense; and
vi. Contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the victim or
the victim's family that the trial court requires.
The application to capital cases and its mandatory consideration by the sentencing body is
codified at MD. CODE ANN. art. 41, § 4-609(d) (1986), which was amended by the Maryland
General Assembly in 1983 to expressly include death penalty cases.
53. MD. CODE ANN. §§ 4-609(c), (d) (1986). In non-homicide cases, the victims themselves
provide the information for the report. Booth did not specifically address the constitutionality of the
use of a VIS or a VSO in a non-capital case.
The complete VIS can be found as an appendix to the Booth decision at 482 U.S. 509. The
rather long statement details the feelings and problems encountered by the survivors and deserves
a complete reading to understand the impact such a statement may have had upon the sentencing
jury. The problems experienced by the victims' family included lack of sleep, depression, and fear
on the part of the victims' son. The victims' daughter told the DPP that she also suffered from lack
of sleep and had become withdrawn and distrustful. She also said that she could not watch violent
movies or look at kitchen knives without being reminded of the murders. She expressed the opinion
that the defendant could "[niever be rehabilitated" and that she could "never forgive anyone for
killing [her parents] that way." The granddaughter told the DPP that she had received counseling
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the VIS could be either read to the sentencing body by the state or introduced
by testimony from the family members who provided information about the
impact of the crime upon them.' The Court reasoned that the information was
both irrelevant to a capital sentencing decision and that its admission created a
constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury might impose the death penalty
in an arbitrary and capricious manner.55 Thus, the Court-in a divided opinion
delivered by Justice Powell -held that the Eighth Amendment57 prohibits a
capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact evidence, and subsequent-
ly vacated the Maryland Court of Appeals decision upholding Booth's
sentence. -
Although termed a VIS by the Maryland statute, the statement read in
Booth included both a VIS and a VSO component.59 The Court recognized
but that "no one could help her." The son stated that his parents "were not killed, but were
butchered like animals" and that no one "should be able to get away with it." The DPP officer
reported, "The family wants the whole thing to be over with and they would like to see swift and
just punishment." Id. at 512-15.
54. In Booth, the prosecutor read the VIS to the jury after making an arrangement with the
defense. Prior to the arrangement, the defense presented a motion to suppress the VIS on the
grounds that the information was both irrelevant and unduly inflammatory in violation of the
defendant's Eighth Amendment protection. The Maryland trial court denied the motion.
Subsequently, the prosecutor acquiesced to a defense request to read the statement rather than
present the direct testimony of the family members. The defense hoped that the reading might lessen
the impact of the statement. 482 U.S. at 500-01.
55. 482 U.S. at 502-03.
56. The Court was divided five to four. Justice Powell authored the opinion of the Court, and
was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Two dissenting opinions were
filed: Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia; Justice
Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor. Booth, 482 U.S.
at 496.
57. The Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
58. 482 U.S. at 502, 509. The Court noted that its decision was guided by the "death is
different" doctrine announced in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1974) (plurality opinion
of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens) and in other circumstances such evidence might be
properly introduced. The Court also noted that in a non-capital criminal trial or in a civil trial where
damages are to be awarded, such evidence might be relevant and its admission is best left to the trial
judge's discretion. 482 U.S. at 509 nn.7 & 12. California has held similarly, in People v. Levitt,
that the family's "bereavement is relevant to damages in a civil action, but it has no relationship to
the proper purposes of sentencing in a criminal case." 156 Cal. App. 3d 500, 516-17 (1984).
59. While the statute termed the report a VIS, the actual report in Booth included both a VIS
and a VSO component. The Court recognized this when it stated: "The VIS in this case provided
the jury with two types of information. First, it described the personal characteristics of the victims
and the emotional impact of the crimes on the family. Second, it set forth the family members'
opinions and characterizations of the crimes and the defendant." Id. at 502-03. The Court discussed
the implications of both, but did not use the exacting terminology used in this note. However, in
light of the above reasoning, Booth applies to both victim participation components. For definitions
as used in this note, see supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
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this, and chose to discuss each component separately.' Regarding the VIS
component, the Court rejected the state's argument that the evidence should be
considered because it revealed the full extent of the harm caused by the
defendant. 6 The Court reasoned that while the full range of foreseeable
consequences might be relevant in non-capital, criminal contexts and in civil
contexts,62 it was not relevant in the unique capital sentencing hearing.63
Such evidence would shift the focus of the hearing from the blameworthiness of
the particular defendant to the character and reputation of the victim and the
effect of the crime on his family.' This shift in focus might cause the jury not
only to disregard the uniqueness of the defendant, but also to impose the death
penalty because of factors about which the defendant neither knew about nor
were relevant to his decision to kill.' Consideration of this irrelevant
information could result in the imposition of the death penalty in a capricious,
arbitrary, and, ultimately, unconstitutional manner;' hence, the introduction
of the VIS violated the defendant's Eighth Amendment rights. 7
60. The discussion of the VIS component may be found at 482 U.S. 503-07 and the VSO
component at 482 U.S. 508-09.
61. 482 U.S. at 503-04. "The State claims that by knowing the extent of the impact upon and
the severity of the loss to the family, the jury was better able to assess the 'gravity or aggravating
quality' of the offense." Id.
62. See supra note 58.
63. 482 U.S. at 504. See also supra note 37. The Court reasoned that the factors presented
in the VIS "may be wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant," and thus
the inquiry might impermissibly shift from the defendant as required by Woodson to the victim and
effect on his family. 482 U.S. 496, 504.
64. 482 U.S. at 504. The Court cited Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304, for the proposition that the
jury in a capital case is required to focus on the defendant as a "uniquely individual human bein[g]."
A VIS that would shift the focus from the defendant to the victim would clearly violate the stated
proposition. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504.
65. 482 U.S. at 504. The Court also noted in a footnote that such evidence might be admissible
if it directly related to the circumstances of the crime, but it gave no guidance as to what this
actually meant. Id. at 507 n.10. The Indiana Supreme Court used this caveat to uphold a death
sentence over the defense's argument that impermissible victim information was presented to the
sentencingjury. See Woods v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1325 (Ind. 1990), discussed infra at notes 103-10
and accompanying text.
66. The Court had previously held that the death penalty could not be imposed under sentencing
procedures that created a substantial risk that the death penalty would be inflicted in an "arbitrary
and capricious manner." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (joint opinion of Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)) (holding that the
imposition of the death penalty in the cases considered constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
67. Additionally, the Court found that VIS evidence might vary depending on the family of the
victim or the victims themselves. Certain families could be expected to be more articulate at
conveying their grief and other families could be altogether lacking. Also, victims would be
different. Some may have been "sterling member[s] of the community," while others may have
been of "questionable character." These variations, the Court held, should not play a part in
deciding whether a defendant should live or die. Booth, 482 U.S. at 505-06. Justice Scalia, in
dissent, did not accept this argument. Id. at 515 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He noted that prosecutors'
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The Court also held that the VSO component of the prosecutor's statement
was inappropriate at the sentencing phase of a capital case. ' The Court found
that the only purpose of the information would be to inflame the jury and divert
its attention from deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty based on
the relevant evidence.' Hence, the introduction of the evidence was improper,
because the jury's determination might become an emotional one rather than the
reasoned determination required by the Court's death penalty jurisprudence. 7
Thus, after Booth, both VIS's and VSO's were considered, in most
situations, to violate the Eighth Amendment and thus were inadmissible at the
sentencing phase of a capital case. 7 Two years later, a similar majority would
extend the Booth rule in South Carolina v. Gathers,72 while the dissenters
continued to question the validity of a rule excluding victim impact evidence
from the jury's consideration.
2. South Carolina v. Gathers
In South Carolina v. Gathers,7 the Court held that comments made by the
abilities to present their arguments to the jury are not the same and neither are different witnesses;
hence, the fact that some victim's families might be more articulate was a "makeweight
consideration." Id. at 517-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
For an analysis of the Booth decision on grounds that the inclusion of a VIS may violate Equal
Protection, see Jonathan Wilmott, Note, Victim Characteristics and Equal Protection for the Lives
ofAll: An Alternative Analysis of Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers and a Proposed
Standard for the Admission of Victim Characteristics in Sentencing, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1045
(1990).
The Court was also concerned with the difficulties the defendant would have in rebutting VIS
evidence. The possibility that the sentencing hearing could become a "mini-trial" concerning the
VIS might distract the jury from determining the appropriateness of the death penalty based on the
defendant and the circumstances of the crime. Booth, 482 U.S. 506-07.
68. Id. at 508-09.
69. Id. at 508.
70. Id. The Court cited to Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (opinion of Justice
Stevens), for the proposition that the death penalty determination should be based on reason rather
than caprice or emotion.
71. See supra note 65 (for the exception to the Booth per se rule of inadmissibility).
72. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
73. Id. The facts of Gathers are particularly disturbing. Gathers and three other youths
encountered the victim, Haynes-a self-proclaimed preacher-in the wooded section of a park at
night. Neither of the parties had met each other before. When Haynes rebuffed an attempt at
conversation by Gathers, Gathers and his friends responded by beating and kicking the victim
severely. Before leaving the scene, Gathers beat Haynes with an umbrella, which he then inserted
into the victim's anus. The youths, apparently looking for something to steal, had rummaged
through the victim's belongings. Haynes' belongings consisted of some Bibles and other religious
symbols that were left strewn about at the scene. Later, Gathers returned to the scene and stabbed
Haynes with a knife. Id. at 806-07. Gathers was later convicted by a jury of murder and second-
degree assault and sentenced to death by the trial court. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme
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prosecutor concerning personal characteristics of the victim, of which the
defendant was unaware at the time of the murder, were unconstitutional.74 The
Court reasoned that the prosecutor's remarks were virtually indistinguishable
from the VIS found to be impermissible in Booth.75 The oily difference, the
Court noted, was that the information was supplied by the prosecution, based on
items found at the crime scene, instead of the victim's family, in which case the
information would have been based on personal qualities. Using the rationale
it had followed in striking down Maryland's VIS statute, the Court held that
allowing the sentencing jury to rely on such information could result in the
imposition of the death penalty because of factors of which the defendant was
unaware, and which were irrelevant to the defendant's decision to kill.76 Such
an imposition would violate the Eighth Amendment. Once again, a minority of
four justices disagreed with the Court's analysis.'
The state also argued that even if Booth was correctly decided, the
information presented by the prosecutor fit the Booth exception, which allowed
the introduction of evidence directly related to the circumstances of the crime.'
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, disagreed. In Booth, the victim's
personal effects and papers were strewn around his body. The Court reasoned
that while evidence of the defendant's apparent search for something to steal was
a relevant circumstance of the crime, and thus a proper subject for comment, the
Court reversed the conviction relying on Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). See South
Carolina v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140 (S.C. 1988). The Supreme Court affirmed.
Faced with a similar situation prior to Gathers, the Indiana Supreme Court did not choose to
interpret Booth as South Carolina had interpreted the case. In Daniels v. State, 528 N.E.2d 775,
782 (Ind. 1988), the Court upheld a death sentence even though the prosecution argued the personal
characteristics of the victim at the sentencing phase.
74. 490 U.S. at 811.
75. Id. The prosecutor admitted only VIS information at the sentencing phase. VSO evidence
was not introduced at the Gathers sentencing hearing. Id.
76. Id.
77. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, believed Booth
was wrongly decided and stood ready to overrule it. However, they believed that Gather's sentence
could be upheld without overturning Booth if that holding was confined to the exclusion of
statements concerning the harm to the victim's family and not the exclusion of "virtually all
consideration of the victim." The comments in Gathers related solely to the personal characteristics
of the victim and were made not by the victim's family, but by the prosecutor. A narrow reading
of Booth's Eighth Amendment rule would allow the Gathers sentence to be upheld. Id. at 814.
Several state courts, including Indiana, had already adopted the minority's narrow reading of Booth.
See, e.g., Daniels v. State, 528 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 1988) (upholding a sentence on the grounds that
the rule announced in Booth would not be applied retroactively); Moon v. State, 375 S.E.2d 442
(Ga. 1988).
Justice Scalia argued that Booth should simply be overruled as being beyond any provision
found in the Constitution and would have upheld the death sentence. Gathers, 490 U.S at 823.
78. See supra note 65.
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content of the papers was irrelevant. 9  Thus, the prosecutor had properly
introduced a description of the crime scene at the guilt phase of the trial, but he
had impermissibly discussed the contents of the crime scene items at the
sentencing phase. The prosecutor noted in his remarks that the victim was a
self-proclaimed minister who was carrying various religious items, including
beads and a plastic angel. Also, the prosecutor told the jury about the contents
of two cards found on the victim: the "Game Guy's Prayer" 8' and a voter
registration card. The contents of these cards, the Court held, could not
possibly have been relevant to the circumstances of the crime and thus did not
fit into the exception announced in Booth.8
Thus, after Booth and Gathers, any information about the victim or the
victim's family not related to the circumstances of the crime or to the
defendant's moral culpability could not be introduced at the sentencing phase of
a capital case. The information was per se inadmissible under the Eighth
Amendment. As Justice O'Connor noted in her dissent in Gathers, the effect
of this rule was to eliminate virtually all consideration of the victim at the
penalty phase.' However, with the retirement of Justice Brennan and the
appointment of Justice Souter, the minority became a majority. Less than two
79. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811. The Court went on to stress that the attack took place at night
on a dark path in a wooded area and the assailants were not using flashlights. Thus, the contents
of the papers that the victim happened to be carrying were "purely fortuitous" and could not be
relevant to the defendants moral culpability.
80. The prayer is as follows and is included to show how irrelevant such a statement was to the
imposition of the severest penalty society can inflict:
Dear God, help me be a sport in this little game of life. I don't ask for any easy
place in this lineup. Play me anywhere you need me. I only ask for the stuff to give
you one hundred percent of what I have got. If all the hard drives seem to come my
way, I thank you for the compliment. Help me to remember that you won't ever let
anything come my way that you and I together can't handle. And help me to take the
bad break as part of the game. Help me to understand that the game is full of knots and
knocks and trouble, and make me thankful for them. Help me to be brave so that the
harder they come the better I like it. And, oh God, help me to always play on the
square. No matter what the other players do, help me to come clean. Help me to study
the book so that I'll know the rules, to study and think a lot about the greatest player
that ever lived and other players that are portrayed in the book. If they ever found out
the best part of the game was helping other guys who are out of luck, help me to find
it out, too. Help me to be a regular, and also an inspiration with the other players.
Finally, oh God, if fate seems to uppercut me with both hands, and I am laid on the
shelf in sickness or old age or something, help me to take that as part of the game, too.
Help me not to whimper or squeal that the game was a frameup or that I had a raw deal.
When in the falling dusk I get to the final bell, I ask for no lying, complimentary
tombstones. I'd only like to know that you feel that I have been a good guy, a good
game guy, a saint in the game of life.
Id. at 808-09.
81. Id. at 811.
82. Id. at 814.
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years after it was announced, the Gathers ruling, along with most of the Booth
rule, would be overruled by Payne v. Tennessee. 3
3. Payne v. Tennessee
The Supreme Court held in Payne" that the Eighth Amendment, 5
contrary to the interpretation given it by Booth and Gathers, did not erect a per
se bar prohibiting a capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact
evidence or prosecutorial argument on that subject.86 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
delivering the opinion of the Court," found that neither evidence relating to the
victim's personal characteristics (as in Gathers) nor the impact of the murder on
the victim's family (as in Booth) is precluded by the Constitution.' Thus, a
state may legitimately conclude that such evidence is relevant to the jury's
determination of whether to impose the death penalty. The Court noted that in
the event such evidence is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the sentencing
determination fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides a mechanism of relief for the prejudiced defendant.89
At the sentencing phase of the trial, the state presented two forms of victim
impact evidence that it had not presented earlier at the guilt phase. First, the
state presented the testimony of the woman who was the mother and grandmoth-
er of the victims. She testified about how the surviving son had been affected
83. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
84. Payne, after driving around town with a friend, returned to the apartment complex where
his girlfriend lived. The Christophers lived across the hall. Payne entered the Christopher's
apartment and began to make sexual advances towards the mother, Charisse. After Charisse resisted
his advances, Payne became violent and proceeded to stab the woman 84 times with a butcher's
knife. Payne also stabbed Charisse's two young children. He killed the youngest, Lacie, and left
Nicholas wounded, presumably to die. A South Carolina jury found Payne guilty of two counts of
first-degree murder in the deaths of Charisse and her two-year old daughter Lacie. Payne was also
convicted of assault with intent to commit murder regarding the attack on Nicholas. Id. at 2601-02.
85. For the text of the Eighth Amendment, see supra note 30.
86. Payne, I llS. Ct. at 2609.
87. In Payne, the majority ruled six to three. The dissenters in Booth and Gathers, Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, were joined by Justice
Souter. Justices Marshall and Stevens filed dissenting opinions in which Justice Blackmun joined.
88. Id. The Court noted, however, that the relevancy of such evidence is left to the discretion
of the states and that each state may decide that such evidence is not relevant to capital proceedings
within their state. Payne, I ll S. Ct. at 2612 (O'Connor, J. concurring.) The Court noted that,
beyond the limitations set by its death penalty jurisprudence, "the Court has deferred to the State's
Choice of substantive factors relevant to the penalty determination." California v. Ramos, 463 U.S.
992, 1001 (1983).
89. Payne, II S. Ct. at 2608 (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179-83 (1986)
(holding that the due process standard of fundamental fairness governs argument of prosecutor at
sentencing)).
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by the murders of his mother and sister.' ° Second, in arguing for the death
penalty during his closing argument, the prosecutor commented on the effects
that the murders had on the son. These comments included a plea that justice
be done for the child's sake. Also, in rebuttal to the defense attorney's closing
argument, the prosecutor discussed how the murdered daughter would not
experience the joys of living and the surviving son would not experience the joys
of having a mother and a sister.9
The Court found that the VIS's made by the prosecutor and the victims'
relative were acceptable forms of evidence in a capital case. The Court
reasoned that, because no prohibition could be found in the Eighth Amendment,
the states had the power to determine the procedures and remedies required to
meet the needs of the public.' A state may legitimately conclude that for the
jury to meaningfully assess the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthi-
ness, it should have before it the harm caused by the defendant even though the
defendant might neither have known of nor intended such consequences.93 The
Court concluded that Booth and Gathers may deprive the state of the full moral
force of its evidence, and may prevent the jury from having the evidence
necessary to determine the proper punishment for a capital offense.94 The
90. She stated that the boy cries for his mother and does not understand why she does not come
home. She also said that he cries for his sister and says that he is "worried about [his] Lacie."
Payne, I IIS. Ct. at 2603.
91. Many of the things discussed by the prosecutor relating to the impact on the surviving son
might have been found to be permissible even without overruling Booth and Gathers, by using the
"relevant to the circumstances of the crime" footnote in Booth. See supra note 65. The defendant
could reasonably have been expected to foresee the impact on the surviving son because he was there
at the scene of the crime and, thus, this was relevant in evaluating the defendant's decision to kill.
Justice Souter impliedly rejected this application in his hypothetical set out in his concurring opinion.
He found that resting the admission of impact evidence on the fortuity of the defendant being made
aware of the victim's family at the time of the murder was arbitrary and unacceptable. Payne, I1l
S. Ct. at 2617 (Souter, J., concurring.)
92. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2608.
93. Id. Justice Souter remarked that criminal conduct has traditionally been categorized and
personalized according to consequences not intended by the defendant. Victim impact is not an
unforeseeable consequence, however. "Every defendant knows, if endowed with the mental
competence for criminal responsibility, that the life he will take by his homicidal behavior is that
of a unique person . . . and that the person to be killed probably has . . . 'survivors,' who will
suffer harms and deprivations from the victim's death." Id. at 2615 (Souter, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 2608. The Court noted that Payne was an excellent example of the state's having
been prevented from presenting to the jury the full force of its evidence if Booth was upheld.
Payne's girlfriend testified that they met at church, that he was affectionate and caring to her
children, and that it would have been inconsistent with his nature to commit the murders. Payne's
parents testified that he was a good son, and a clinical psychologist testified that Payne was a polite
prisoner and had a low IQ. Following Booth, the defendant is allowed to have the jury consider this
mitigating evidence, but the state cannot show the other side. The Court agreed with the Supreme
Court of Tennessee's finding that the rule was unfair. The Tennessee court said:
It is an affront to . . . the human race to say that at sentencing in a capital case, a
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Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause is available to safeguard the
defendant's right to a fair trial if the evidence is so unduly prejudicial that it
renders the trial fundamentally unfair.95
Thus, after Payne, victim impact evidence may be introduced at the
sentencing phase of a capital case subject only to the limitations imposed by the
Due Process Clause. The effect of this holding is that Gathers was totally
overruled, but part of Booth remains good law. Booth held that both VIS's and
VSO's were constitutionally impermissible under the Eighth Amendment.'
Payne did not address the constitutionality of the VSO holding, and the Court
made it perfectly clear that the holding was limited to overturning the VIS
holdings of Booth and Gathers.7 Hence, for the time being, the VSO remains
unconstitutional under Booth." After Payne, a VIS-evidence relating to the
victim or the impact on the victim's family-is appropriate in a capital
sentencing hearing. However, the introduction of a VSO-evidence relating to
the victim's characterizations and opinions of the crime, defendant, and the
appropriate sentence-violates the Eighth Amendment.
B. Indiana Jurisprudence
While some jurisdictions chose to interpret Booth liberally, 99 others,
including Indiana, I"0 chose to narrow its application and hold that it did not
parade of witnesses may praise the background, character, and good deeds of [the
defendant], without limitation to relevancy, but nothing may be said that bears upon the
character of, or the harm imposed by the victims.
791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tenn. 1987).
95. See supra note 89.
96. See supra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
97. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2611 n.2 (1991) (holding that since no such evidence
was presented by the prosecutor, the holding concerning VSO's in Booth was left undisturbed).
98. The Court did not address the constitutionality of VSO's because this issue was not
presented; however, it appears likely that the last vestiges of Booth will fall, given the proper case.
In Booth, the dissent made no distinction between the two types of information discussed by the
majority. The dissent found nothing in the Constitution to impose limitations upon the states as to
what type of evidence could be admitted. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 at 515-16 (1987)
(White, J., dissenting) and at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, it would appear that the present
Court would leave the determination of the relevancy of VSO's to the discretion of the state
legislatures.
99. See, e.g., State v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140 (S.C. 1988), affd, 490 U.S. 805 (1989),
discussed at supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text. The South Carolina Supreme Court, in
reversing the trial court's death penalty determination, had read Booth for the broad proposition that
the injection of the victim's personal characteristics by any party into the sentencing determination
violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 144.
100. Daniels v. State, 528 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 1988), rev'd, 491 U.S. 902 (1989) (holding that
the cause be remanded for consideration in light of Gathers), and rev'd, 561 N.E.2d 487 (Ind. 1990)
(reversing on the grounds that while Booth and Gathers may have been violated, retroactive
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prohibit prosecutorial argument concerning the personal characteristics of the
victim at the sentencing phase of the trial."' After Gathers, state courts had
no choice but to reverse their earlier holdings and, applying the extension made
in Booth, find that prosecutorial comments were inadmissible under the Eighth
Amendment.'02 However, before Payne was announced, the Indiana Supreme
Court did not reverse any death penalty determinations under the Booth/Gathers
rule. In fact, the Indiana Supreme Court demonstrated that it was willing to use
the exception to uphold other death penalty determinations.
In Woods v. State, 3 the Indiana court upheld the conviction and sentence
of the defendant °4 even though the prosecutor's summation contained victim
impact evidence.0 5 The prosecutor had discussed the personal characteristics
of the victim, and the effect that the victim's murder would have on the family.
This appears to be exactly the type of information that the Gathers Court found
to be unconstitutional. However, the Indiana court reasoned that Booth and
Gathers prohibited victim impact evidence only if it was irrelevant to the moral
culpability of the defendant or the circumstances of the crime." The
prosecutor's comments in Woods, the Court held, were relevant to both because
the defendant was previously acquainted with the victim and thus knew about his
personal characteristics and closeness with his family.'07
Following Payne, the Indiana Supreme Court has had only one opportunity
to rule on the admissibility of victim information of the type found to be
constitutionally permissible under the Eighth Amendment."' s Two options
were available to the Indiana court after Payne; first, the Indiana Supreme Court
application of them to a case on collateral review at the time of the decision was inappropriate),
101. See, e.g., State v. Daniels, 528 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 1988); Moon v. State, 375 S.E.2d 442
(Ga. 1988). See also People v. Rich, 755 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1988); People v. Ghent, 739 P.2d 1250
(Cal. 1987).
102. Justice DeBruler, dissenting in Daniels v. State, 561 N.E.2d 487, 492 (Ind. 1990), would
have reconsidered the prosecutor's remarks in light of Gathers as the Supreme Court had instructed
the Indiana Supreme Court to do. He found that the remarks were irrelevant to the jury's
consideration and applying Gathers would have reversed the death penalty determination. Id.
103. 557 N.E.2d 1325 (Ind. 1990).
104. Id. at 1326.
105. Id. The prosecutor stated that the victim was physically frail, that the victim's family
grieved the loss, and that the defendant had deprived the family of the victim's company. He also
stated that the defendant was an executioner that deserved no more than he gave his victim and that
the victim, before being killed, had not been given the due process rights which the defendant had
received. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The defendant knew the victim because his mother had worked for him. Thus, he was
aware of the victim's frailty and the closeness of the victim with his family. Also, the court found
that the defendant knew that had he not killed the victim, the victim would have been able to identify
him. Id.
108. Benirschke v. State, 577 N.E.2d 576 (Ind. 1991).
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could follow the U.S. Supreme Court's lead on the admissibility of victim
evidence. Alternatively, the court could find that while the evidence did not
violate the federal Constitution, it violated the Indiana Constitution and thus was
impermissible in an Indiana capital sentencing hearing. In Benirschke v.
State," the Indiana court chose the former. The court ruled summarily that
in light of Payne, the prosecutor's comments to the jury regarding the impact
of the murder upon the victim's family did not violate the state's constitu-
tion. 1 ' Additionally, the Indiana court found that the VIS admitted was
essentially the same as was found to be admissible under Woods, and would
have been admissible even before Payne was decided.
Thus, Indiana seems resigned, at least at this time, to follow the Supreme
Court's lead on the question of evidence permitted by the Eighth Amendment.
However, the court could have found that under Indiana's Eighth Amendment
analogue, Booth and Gathers were the proper interpretation of Indiana's
protection."' Perhaps the Indiana court wished to find the information
admitted to be unconstitutional but, because Benirschke's counsel did not base
her argument on Indiana's Constitution, the court felt bound to decide the case
on the federal grounds."' However, Indiana need not disagree with the
rationality of Payne to find that, while VIS's and VSO's are permitted under the
Eighth Amendment, their admission is unconstitutional in Indiana. Section 18
of Indiana's bill of rights can provide protection in this area." 3
109. Id.
110. Id. at 578.
111. Indiana Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard recognized this when he cited Justice Brennan
in a recent article. See Randall T. Shepard, Indiana Law, the Supreme Court and a New Decade,
24 IND. L. REV. 499, 504 (1991). Justice Brennan, in a dissent from a Burger Court decision on
the constitutional rights of a defendant, urged state courts to use their own constitutions to afford
protection not available under the federal charter. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120
(1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The federal Constitution provides the minimum protection that a defendant must be given and
no one questions a state's power to construe state provisions as providing broader protection for
individual rights. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). See also
IND. CONST. art. I § 16, which provides that criminal sentence must be proportional to the crime;
the Supreme Court has recently decided that the federal Constitution provides no such guarantee.
See Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
112. Shepard has noted that a party must argue the Indiana law primarily-and not merely as
an addendum to the federal argument-to prevail on an Indiana constitutional claim. Randall T.
Shepard, A Second Wind for the Bill of Rights, 22 IND. L. REv. 575 (1989). The Chief Justice is
not alone in requiring that a state constitutional issue be argued as a separate and individual claim.
See, e.g., State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 234-36 (Vt. 1985) (admonishing parties for their
inadequate briefs and ordering a supplemental briefing on the state issues).
113. Indiana is not adverse to giving the defendant rights not granted by the federal
Constitution. See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 96 N.E.2d 876 (Ind. 1951) (granting the indigent
defendant a right to counsel years before the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Gideon v. Wainwright,
that the right was guaranteed by the federal Constitution. 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). But see Thomas
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III. THE INDIANA CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS RETRIBUTIVE OR VINDICTIVE
STATUTES IN THE PENAL CODE
This Section will demonstrate that the criminal statutes of Indiana's penal
code must be based primarily on the principles of reformation, not retribution,
as mandated by section 18 of the Indiana Bill of Rights. Any statute failing to
meet these criteria must be found unconstitutional. However, this Section will
also show that while reformation must be the tantamount goal of all criminal
statutes, the alternative justifications of deterrence and incapacitation are
constitutionally permissible. First, to determine the constitutionally permissible
justifications, the actual language of section 18 will be examined. Second, an
attempt to discern the legislative intent from the convention debates and the time
period in which the section was enacted will be made. Third, this Section will
examine the Indiana Supreme Court's early section 18 jurisprudence to show that
existing state law would not uphold a statute based solely on retribution. Thus,
if the Indiana Supreme Court is presented with a retribution-based statute, it is
constitutionally bound to strike it down.
A. The Constitutional Language
In what was arguably a more enlightened era, the Indiana framers made a
conscious decision regarding the type of penal code they wished to have in their
newly formed state.' 14  At the same time, the framers proscribed the
v. Indianapolis, 145 N.E. 550 (Ind. 1924) (upholdingan ordinance prohibiting all picketing); Waters
v. Indianapolis, 134 N.E. 482 (Ind. 1922) (upholding a city ordinance making it unlawful to carry
any banner, placard, advertisement, or handbill in any public place). The U.S. Supreme Court
eventually incorporated the First Amendment to apply to the states, thus giving citizens more
freedom of expression than the Indiana Court was willing to give. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925).
114. Many influential thinkers, philosophers, and statesmen began to reject the retributive
justification of punishment during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in favor of a utilitarian
model. This model saw reformation as the primary goal of penology, but realized that the ideal was
not always attainable. Thus, incapacitation and deterrence were seen as permissible alternative goals
of punishment. Stephen Kantner, Dealing with Death: The Constitutionality of Capital Punishment
in Oregon, 16 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 38 (1979). The Indiana Constitution was drafted during this
time period. See generally CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT (Henry Paolucci
trans., 1963); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970). For the view that the historical cycle has
shifted from reformation back to vengeance as the primary justification for punishment, see Leonard
Orland, From Vengeance to Vengeance: Sentencing Reform and the Demise of Rehabilitation, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 29 (1978) (illustrating this shift by examining the abandonment of indeterminate
sentencing and parole in favor of determinate sentencing codes).
The Supreme Court is not immune from the movement towards retributive justification of
punishment and has specifically stated that retribution is a socially acceptable goal under the Eighth
Amendment in capital cases. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (noting,
"Retribution is ...neither ...a forbidden objective nor one inconsistent with the dignity of
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legislature from basing the penal code on principles that were uniformly
rejected. These principles, both accepted and rejected, are embodied in article
I, section 18 of the Indiana Constitution. Section 18 mandates that "[tlhe penal
code shall be founded on the principles of reformation and not of vindictive
justice. " 5 Several principles may be discerned about the provision from this
simple and concise language.
First, the framers saw "the principles of reformation" as being mutually
exclusive from the principles of "vindictive justice."" 6 This is inferred from
the form of the provision itself. The language "shall be founded on... and not
of" suggests that the framers found the two principles to be diametrically
opposed and inconsistent with each other. Hence, the penal code must be
founded on the principle of reformation and not on vindictiveness or retribu-
tion.''7
However, it is not as obvious that the framers desired reformation to be the
only permissible goal of the penal code. Assuming that they were aware of
alternative punishment justificationsI -namely, deterrence and incapacitation
man."); Furman v. Georgia, 404 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that "[tlhe
instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration
of criminal justice serves an important purpose . . . ."). While Gregg accepted retribution as an
acceptable goal, it implicitly rejected the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment offered by Justice
Marshall in Furman v. Georgia, 404 U.S. 238, 247 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that
"retribution for its own sake is improper" and the Court had "consistently denigrated retribution as
a permissible goal of punishment. The Eighth Amendment is our insulation from our baser
selves.").
115. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
116. Kantner, supra note 114, at 1. Kantner interprets an Oregon constitutional provision
directly borrowed from § 18. OR. CONST., art. 1 § 15 provides that "flaws for the punishment of
crime shall be founded on principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice" (emphasis added
to distinguish the difference between the provisions). Kantner concludes that the provision precludes
capital punishment in Oregon because it is inherently vindictive. Because of the similarity between
the provisions, several inferences made from the language are directly applicable when interpreting
Indiana's provision.
117. At least one Indiana Supreme Court justice has expressly recognized this proposition. See
Judy v. State, 416 N.E.2d 95, 113 (Ind. 1981) (DeBruler, J., dissenting) (holding that "[§ 18's]
plain meaning is that principles of reformation must underpin the establishment of criminal penalties
to the exclusion of principles of vindictive justice.").
Also, for the purpose of this note, vindictive justice and retribution- are seen to be
synonymous. Justice DeBruler also has stated that § 18 bars vengeance and retribution. Id. The
theory of retribution will be discussed in greater detail. See infra notes 155-64.
118. The debates of the 1850 Indiana convention suggest that the framers were aware of these
goals, although they did not specifically discuss them. Bryant remarked soon after § 18 was
proposed that the object of punishment was twofold: "the prevention of crime and the reformation
of the offender." 2 H. FOWLER, REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION
FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1903 (Indiana Historical
Collections Reprint 1935) (1850) [hereinafter DEBATES]. The prevention of crime could be
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-the framers could have included or excluded either justification specifically.
The framers chose to do neither. Hence, two possible constructions of section
18 are possible: that deterrence and incapacitation are acceptable goals as long
as reformation remains the paramount goal of the penal code; or that reforma-
tion is the only goal upon which a penal code could be constructed, and a code
based on any alternative rationale would be invalid." 9 The latter construction
would seem to be an unwise choice as it would limit the legislature to
reformative provisions possibly at the expense of protecting society. The more
likely construction, then, is the former. While reformation would be the
ultimate goal of the penal code, the protection of society would not be
compromised by prohibiting statutes enacted for the purposes of deterrence and
incapacitation. "
Second, the provision recognizes that the legislature may periodically enact
statutes, either intentionally or unintentionally, that are vindictive in nature. ' 2
" Since the provision specifically prohibits this, the duty to screen out such
construed to include both deterrence and incapacitation. Indeed, this is consistent with utilitarian
theory, which was popular during the time of the constitution's creation.
119. The question can be put another way. If Y told X that she "shall do A," but "shall not do
B," and A and B are mutually exclusive acts, does this necessarily preclude X from doing C or D?
The answer lies in whether or not the statement includes the entire universe of options available to
the actor. If A and B constitute the entire universe, C and D are precluded. The above language
does not limit the universe, however. Had Ywished to preclude the Cand D options, he could have
told Xthat she may "only do A." Also, with this formulation, the prohibition against B would not
be needed. Hence, the selected language absent the "only" suggests that other options might not
be precluded and that both the Cand D options are available to the actor. By applying this analysis
to § 18, it appears that deterrence and incapacitation are not prohibited by the language, so long as
reformation is the paramount goal.
Also, the contextual background of the statement must be considered. The context may
suggest that the universe of options was curtailed or implicitly expanded. That utilitarian theory was
the dominant justification at the time the Indiana Constitution suggests that while reformatory
principles must be included and perhaps be overarching, the section does not prohibit deterrence or
incapacitation.
Another rule that could be applied to the provision is the Latin maxim, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. BLACK'S LAW DIcIoNARY 581 (6th ed. 1990) ("[T]he expression of one thing
is the exclusion of another."). Indiana recognized this principle in State ex rel. Thomas v. Williams,
151 N.E.2d 499 (Ind. 1958), and Robinson v. Moser, 179 N.E. 270 (Ind. 1931). A strict
application of this rule would preclude any rationale except reformation. However, the apparent
intent of the framers would be frustrated if the rule were applied in such a manner. Oregon also
rejected this argument. See State v. Cochran, 105 P. 884, 891 (Or. 1909).
120. This is in accord with the utilitarian theory of punishment. The Indiana Supreme Court
has also recognized that while reformation must ultimately be the goal of the penal code under this
section, the legislature is not obliged to pursue such goals at the expense of the protection of society.
Dillon v. State, 454 N.E.2d 845, 852 (Ind. 1983). Such an interpretation seems consistent with the
framers' intentions.
121. Kantner, supra note 114, at 31.
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statutes falls to the courts, acting as guardians of the constitution.'" Third,
the constitution requires only that the penal code as a whole be inculcated with
the principles of reform. This means that some individual statutes may have one
of the alternative justifications discussed above." a This lends credence to the
construction that allows the rationales of deterrence and incapacitation to be
included in the formulation of criminal statutes.
Thus, it can be seen from the language of the provision that the justifica-
tions of reformation, deterrence, and incapacitation are acceptable. As long as
the penal code is essentially reformatory, a statute need not be struck down
because it advances only the policies of deterrence or incapacitation."
However, because retribution is categorically prohibited when all three accepted
rationales are absent, the statute must be found unconstitutional as retribution is
undeniably prohibited by the language of the constitution.
B. Constitutional History of Section 18
The 1816 constitutional convention led to the creation of the first Indiana
Constitution' in less than three weeks" because the delegates borrowed
from existing state constitutions. 27 The predecessor to the current section 18
was article IX, section 4.I2s That section was also borrowed from what was
122. See Public Service Comm. v. Indianapolis, 131 N.E.2d 308 (Ind. 1956) (DeBruler, J.)
(stating that the court has a duty to determine if a specific act is prohibited by the constitution).
123. Had the framers wished that each and every statute be based on reformation, they could
have specifically mandated such a result by providing that "[ali criminal statutes shall be based upon
... .. Additionally, the framers could have restricted the provision to apply only to sentencing as
Oregon did in its constitutional provision-"[I]aws for the punishment of crime . . " OR. CONST.,
art. 1, § 15.
124. Such a statute may be acceptable under § 18, but it should probably be subjected to closer
scrutiny to ensure that the effect of the statute, in combination with other similar statutes, does not
shift the focus of the penal code from its overall reformative purpose. The invalidation of a statute
on this basis would most likely be a rare occasion. However, if the court determined that a statute
shifted the code away from reformation, it would be bound to strike it down as a penal code based
primarily on either deterrence or incapacitation in violation of § 18.
125. Robert Twomley, The Indiana Bill of Rights, 20 IND. L. REV. 211 (1945).
126. Id. at 212. Twomley's article provides a general history of the 1816 and 1850 bills of
rights and also discusses each section of the 1850 bill of rights individually.
127. The convention borrowed the constitution almost entirely from the Ohio Constitution of
1802 and the Kentucky Constitution of 1799. CHARLES KETTLEBOROUGH, I CONSTITUTION MAKING
IN INDIANA xx (1916). The major difference between the Ohio and Kentucky Constitutions and the
new Indiana Constitution concerned the provision relating to amendments to the constitution. Id.
This later proved to be the cause of the call for the 1850 convention.
128. IND. CONST. OF 1816, art IX, § 4. "It shall be the duty of the General assembly, as soon
as circumstances permit, to form a penal code founded on the principles of reformation, and not of
vindictive justice .... " The committee reported the provision to the convention with no subsequent
amendments being recorded. KETTLEBOROUGH, supra note 127, at 115.
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perceived to be best from a sister state's constitution. "2 The framers pulled
language from the Ohio Constitution, article VIII, section 14,' 30 to create the
predecessor to section 18.
At the convention, little debate or discussion surrounded either the creation
of the constitution or the bill of rights. 3' The committee on the preamble and
the bill of rights created the bill of rights, which included twenty-four distinct
sections, just two days after the committee had been formed. 32 The delegates
did not debate the vast majority of the provisions because they saw themselves
as assembling well-settled principles of government to fit the needs of the newly-
formed state.'33 It may be inferred that section 18's predecessor received no
attention because the assembly felt that it was a well-settled principle that
reformation was the proper goal of any penal code and a vindictive code should
be avoided.
A growing dissatisfaction with the 1816 constitution prompted the call for
the 1850 constitutional convention." The original bill of rights had seldom
been criticized, 3' but the convention appointed the Committee on Rights and
Privileges to draft a new bill." The 1850 convention pursued a more
129. The practice of borrowing language from constitutions perceived to be acceptable appears
to have been rather common. Oregon borrowed heavily from Indiana's Constitution. As one framer
declared at the Oregon Convention of 1857 in support of modeling Oregon's Constitution after
Indiana's Constitution, "Its Bill of Rights... is gold-refined; it is up with the progress of the age.
I desire that such a bill may precede or become part of our constitution." Kantner, supra note 114,
at 37 (quoting THE OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION OF 1857, 101-102 (Charles H. Carey ed., 1857)). Other states also borrowed
from Indiana's Constitution, including Washington and Montana.
130. KETTLEBOROUGH, supra note 127, at xx. The analogous section of the Ohio Constitution,
art. VIII, § 14 read, "For the same reasons, a multitude of sanguinary laws are both impolitic and
unjust; the true design of all punishments being to reform rather than exteninate mankind"
(emphasis added). Ohio had, in fact, borrowed this section. The original author was Blackstone.
See BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 727-40 (J.W. Ehrlich ed., Nourse Publishing Co. 1959). No
similar provision existed in the Kentucky Constitution of 1799.
131. Twomley, supra note 125, at 211. The conventionamended only § 5 of the bill of rights.
This section grants the right of trial by jury. Id. at n. 1.
132. Id. at 211.
133. Id. Section 5 of the 1816 bill of rights was the only provision changed after being
presented by the committee on the preamble and bill of rights. The convention adopted the
reformation provision without debate. Id.
134. The major dissatisfaction concerned the method of amending the constitution.
135. Twomley, supra note 125, at 213.
136. The committee was formed on October 8, 1850, one day after the convention had begun.
JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF INDIANA TO AMEND THE
CONSTITUTION 17 (Indiana Historical Collections Reprint 1936 (1851) [hereinafter JOURNAL].
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deliberative approach than its predecessor in the creation of the new constitu-
tion. ' Eventually, three hundred and thirty-three resolutions embodying
provisions desired either by the delegates or their constituents were presented for
consideration. " Section 18 of the new bill of rights, however, was neither
the reason for the lengthened deliberations nor a highly debated issue.
On January 29, 1850, Walter March 39 proposed an amendment to the
section then being considered by the convention. This amendment stated that
"[t]he penal code of this state shall be founded on the principles of reformation,
and not of vindictive justice."" 4  James Bryant 4' concurred with March's
assessment that the purpose of all punishment should be to prevent crime while
at the same time attempting to reform the offender. 42 However, Bryant
suggested that the amendment be offered as a distinct section, as he had "no
doubt but that it [would] pass."' 3  March, following Bryant's advice,
withdrew the amendment and presented the section directly following the
resolution of debated topic."' The proposal was eventually adopted without
debate and became section 18 of the Indiana Bill of Rights. 4
The lack of debate concerning the provision does not imply that it was
thought to be of little import. Ohio revised its constitution the same year and
137. This can be seen by several factors. First, the 1816 constitution contained little new or
original thought and was the standard type then in vogue in many of the older commonwealths.
KETTLEBOROUGH, supra note 127, at xx. Second, while the 1816 convention lasted a mere 20 days,
the 1850 convention lasted over six times as long. Id. at lxxxix. Third, the 1850 convention had
almost twice as many committees drafting sections that the 1816 convention. Thus, it appears that
the latter convention delegates tried to be more thorough in their creation of the new constitution.
138. KETTLEBOROUGH, supra note 127, at 234. The first resolution was submitted on October
9, 1849, three days into the convention; the final being introduced on January 29, only two weeks
before final adjournment. Id.
139. March wasa delegate from the district of Grant and Delaware. DEBATES, supra note 118,
at 3.
140. This section was proposed as an addendum to the provision authorizing the legislature to
provide homes of refuge for the correction and reformation of juveniles. Id. at 1903.
141. Bryant was a delegate from Warren County. Id. at 4.
142. Bryant was especially distressed with the number ofjuveniles ending up in the state prison,
where reformation was extremely unlikely. DEBATES, supra note 118, at 1903.
143. Id. at 1903.
144. Id. at 1904. The text presented was exactly the same as had been proposed by March only
moments earlier.
145. The convention adopted the provision and ordered it to be engrossed for its third and final
reading. They adopted the section after its final reading the following day without vote and referred
it to the committee on revision, arrangement, and phraseology. For an unknown reason, the
committee excised the words "of this state" from the final version. KETTLEBOROUGH, supra note
127, at 299 n.49. The exact location in the Convention Journal can be found at JOURNAL, supra
note 136, at 835.
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deleted the reformative rationale from its new constitution." However, the
Indiana delegates chose to keep the reformative provision. One may conclude
that there must have been a strong consensus in favor of this provision. Absent
a strong consensus, there would have been some debate, or else an alternative
proposal would have been forwarded, much like March had done. The delegates
must have believed uniformly that the purpose of the penal code should be to
reform the offender rather than to exact retribution on him. Section 18 must
embody what the framers desired to be the paramount purpose of the penal
code, and must indicate what is to be avoided, as well. A penal code that was
primarily based on any justification other than reformation, or that included
retributive statutes, would be contrary to the intent and purpose of the accepted
provision.
C. Indiana Supreme Court Jurisprudence Concerning Section 18
Most of the Indiana Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning section 18
has dealt with the issue of capital punishment. Defendants have made numerous
attempts to seek the reversal of death sentences on the grounds that the death
penalty is vindictive and thus violates the provision. The Indiana Supreme Court
has uniformly rejected this argument,' 47 however, and has continued to uphold
the validity of capital punishment in Indiana."4
The Indiana Supreme Court was first faced with this argument in Driskill
v. State.49 The court, apparently as a matter of first impression, held that the
death penalty was not inconsistent with section 18 of the Indiana Constitution.
Writing for the court, Justice Davison said,
The punishment of death for murder in the first-degree, is not, in our
opinion, vindictive, but is even-handed justice. . . . The eighteenth
section of the bill of rights, when properly construed, requires the
penal laws to be so framed as to protect society, and at the same time
... inculcate the principle of reform.
146. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 49 (Baldwin 1982).
147. Justice DeBruler and former Justice Prentice, however, are of the opinion that the death
penalty violates § 18. See Williams v. State, 430 N.E.2d 759 (Ind. 1982) (DeBruler, J., dissenting);
Adams v. State, 271 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1971) (Prentice, J. and DeBruler, J., dissenting).
148. See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 37 N.E.2d 79 (Ind. 1941); MeCutcheon v. State, 155 N.E.
544 (Ind. 1927); Rice v. State, 7 Ind. 332 (1855).
149. 7 Ind. 338 (1855) (per curiam).
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This holding is necessarily based on the assumption that, in 1855, capital
punishment in Indiana effectively served utilitarian goals' 50 and was not based
on retribution.'5 ' According to the court's own analysis, if there had been
evidence that the state's capital punishment scheme was retributive, the court
would have been bound to declare that the scheme was unconstitutional. Later
cases have echoed Driskill's interpretation of section 18 with regard to the
imposition of the death penalty.
Thus, an examination of the plain meaning of the language and the intent
of the framers, coupled with the early court's interpretation of the provision,
leads to the conclusion that the Indiana Constitution forbids retributive statutes
in its penal code. While the penal code must be founded primarily on the
principles of reformation, alternatives are not proscribed if they help to protect
society. Therefore, if victim participation statutes are found to advance
reformation, deterrence, or incapacitation, and are not motivated by the goal of
retribution, they will be constitutionally permissible. However, if they advance
none of the permissible justifications or are based on the forbidden goal of
retribution, they must be struck down.
IV. VICTIM PARTICIPATION STATUTES ARE BOTH RETRIBUTIVE
AND VINDICTIVE
This Section argues that victim participation in the sentencing phase of a
capital case is both retributive and vindictive. Additionally, this Section argues
that victim participation does not serve the constitutionally permissible goals of
reformation, deterrence, or incapacitation. When faced with conclusive evidence
that victim participation statutes are retributive and do not advance the
permissible justifications of section 18, the Indiana Supreme Court must find
them to be unconstitutional.
A. Constitutionally Impermissible Goals: Retribution and Vindication
Very little agreement exists regarding the exact parameters of the
retributivist theory of punishment. 52  Generally, retribution'53 is defined as
150. The death penalty has been said to further the goal of deterrence. However, this is
certainly the subject of a great deal of debate. Also, the death penalty could be seen to be the
ultimate incapacitation of the offender. Thus, in 1855, the court must have found that the death
penalty effectively served one of these goals, or it would have been bound by § 18 to strike it down.
151. Kantner, supra note 114, at 40.
152. Id. at 5. Kantner also notes several previous definitional attempts and recognizes their
imprecision and inconsistency. Id. at 5 n.27. See also Paul Boudreaux, Booth v. Maryland and the
Individual Vengeance Rationale for Criminal Punishment, 80 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 177, 185
(1989) "The most unfocused of the [penal] justifications is social retribution. The stock of
commonly used expressions is testament to its nature: 'eye for an eye', 'just desserts', 'moral
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"the deliberate and official infliction of pain on an offender based on an
assessment of the offender's moral responsibility for committing an of-
fense."" In other words, the offender is given his just desserts. H.L.A.
Hart contends that this theory asserts the following: First, that a person may be
punished if and only if he has voluntarily done something morally wrong;
second, that his punishment must match or be equivalent to the wickedness of
the offense; and third, that the justification for punishing under such conditions,
the return of suffering for moral evil voluntarily done, is itself just and morally
good. 155 Immanuel Kant would add that retribution is not merely permissible
against the offender, but obligatory." Essentially, social retribution can be
reduced to the contention that criminals deserve punishment because they
deserve punishment.' 57
The other definition of retribution, and perhaps the one most likely to come
to mind, is that of revenge." Society has a right to retaliate against those
who have hurt its citizens or failed to follow its rules. 159  The prosecutor
stands in the shoes of the victim but uses the criminal justice system to retaliate
against the defendant in the name of the state, instead of taking individual
vengeance."' ° Supporters agree that this theory is justified not only because
individual victims are able to vindicate themselves and release the hate and anger
inside them, but also because it channels society's outrage and prevents mob
punishment', 'debt to society', or 'pay for the crime'." Id.
153. Retribution is also called revenge or retaliation. WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W.
SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 25 (1986).
154. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment,
74 CORNELL L. REv. 655,659 (1989).
155. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 231 (1982). The third assertion, that
punishment is morally good in itself, is in direct contradiction with the utilitarian justification for
-punishment, which sees all punishment as an evil in itself which can only be used to meet some
greater evil. See BENTHAM, supra note 114.
156. Id. at 232. Thus, if two persons are left in the world and one murders the other, the sole
remaining citizen must be put to death under this theory.
157. Boudreaux, supra note 152, at 186. See also Jack P. Gibbs, The Death Penalty,
Retribution and Penal Policy, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 291, 295-96 (1978). Gibbs suggests
that while this proposition does not distort the retributive doctrine, it points out its fundamental
shortcoming. Once a retributivist has made this statement, he really has nothing more to say. Gibbs
goes on to discuss the problems of the retributive doctrine and the fact that it offers no solutions to
the specific problems haunting the criminal justice system. He concludes that the doctrine is
attractive precisely because it is an empty formula. Id.
158. Henderson, supra note 5, at 991.
159. Id.
160. Leslie Sebba, The Victim's Role in the Penal Process: A Theoretical Orientation, 30 AM.
J. CoMP. L. 217, 232 (1982).
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violence that might occur absent the retribution.
61
Recent victim's rights legislation appears to be driven by the retaliatory
view of retribution rather than the Kant-Hart moral retributivist view. 6 2 One
commentator has noted that victim participation in sentencing specifically
emphasizes the retributive and retaliatory aspects of punishment and stresses
personal vengeance."a In fact, this is the most persistent criticism of victim
participation. Critics argue that victim participation will reduce the criminal
justice system to a forum for personal vendettas and revenge-a throwback to
the ancient practice of blood feuds-and thereby frustrate rational and dispas-
sionate decision making." The Indiana framers obviously wished to avoid
such a system, as is evidenced by their having included section 18's prohibition
against vindictive justice.
In capital sentencing, the possibility that the hearing may become a forum
for vengeance is even more apparent. Because the sentencing body is presented
with a binary decision-namely, life or death-any request by the victim that the
defendant be put to death appears per se vindictive. An examination of an actual
VIS helps to show the retributive and vindictive aspects that victim participation
introduces.
At the sentencing hearing of the much publicized murder trial of Robert
Chambers, popularly known as the "Preppy Murderer," the father of the victim
submitted a letter to the court in support of the imposition of the death penalty.
The letter queried the court: "How can you talk of punishment? What number
of years can equate to her senseless death?" The father stated his own
conclusion: "A lifetime of incarceration would be inadequate."" From the
VIS, it appears that the father wanted to avenge the death of his daughter by
seeing that the defendant received his just desserts. While one can try to
understand the feelings of the victim's father and can certainly understand his
anger towards his daughter's murderer, the father's comments only furthered
161. Henderson, supra note 5, at 994-95. She argues that this is actually a utilitarian argument,
however, and cannot adequately support the retaliation model. See also Steven J. Schulhofer, Harm
and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U.
PA. L. REv. 1497, 1508-14 (1974).
162. Henderson, supra note 5, at 994.
163. Dina R. Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform or Reprisal?, 27 AMER. CRIM.
L. REv. 391, 398 (1989). She notes, "Proponents argue that 'the consideration of [the victim's]
needs and opinions can help [him] regain a sense of control over his life and fulfill a desire for
retributive justice." Id. at n.28.
164. Howard C. Rubel, Victim Participation in Sentencing Proceedings, 28 CRIM. L.Q. 226,
237-38 (1986). The prospect of allowing victims to use the system in retaliation against defendants
enjoys little support among social scientists and practitioners. Henderson, supra note 5, at 994-95.
165. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1988, at 36, col 4.
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retributive goals. Such goals are not permitted under the Indiana Constitution
and no other constitutionally permissible goals can be supported by the
statement.
Thus, victim participation at sentencing introduces a retributive element into
the determination of the criminal sentence. If, however, the retributive element
can be omitted from the victim participation statutes and another permissible
goal can be achieved by the inclusion of the victim at sentencing, such
participation would be constitutional. Hence, the next subsection of this Note
will examine the constitutionally permissible goals of rehabilitation, deterrence,
and incapacitation to determine whether victim participation advances these penal
justifications.
B. Constitutionally Permissible Goals: Rehabilitation, Deterrence, and
Incapacitation
Rehabilitation, or reformation, is the paramount goal of the penal system
under the Indiana Constitution as expressed by section 18." Under this
theory, defendants are punished by being given appropriate treatment. This is
done in the hope that they can be rehabilitated and returned to society
sufficiently reformed such that they will not commit further crimes. 167
Appropriate treatment, H.L.A. Hart proposed, "embraces any strengthening of
the offender's disposition and capacity to keep him within the law . . . which
is intentionally brought about by human effort [rather] than through fear of
punishment."'" Generally, this "human effort" falls into two categories:
inducing repentance by helping the defendant recognize his moral guilt or
providing psychological treatment and education.69
In some situations, VIS's and VSO's may further the goal of reformation
by helping with the treatment of defendants. If the sentencing authority believes
that a defendant might repent when faced with direct evidence of his moral guilt,
a VIS might be the best evidence of the harm caused.'70 An example of this
might be in a case where the defendant has killed someone through his drunken
166. See supra notes 118-54 and accompanying text.
167. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 153, at 24. However, as one commentator has noted,
"[W]e do not know how to rehabilitate offenders, at least within the limits of the resources that are
now or might reasonably be expected to be devoted to the task." HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS
OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 55 (1978). Henderson claims that while this might be true in a general
sense, knowledge exists about substance abuse and criminal activity, and this provides at least some
direction for rehabilitative efforts. Henderson, supra note 5, at 990 n.247.
168. Hart, supra note 155, at 25-26.
169. Phillip A. Talbert, Comment, The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the Criminal
Sentencing Decision, 36 UCLA L. REv. 199, 217 (1988).
170. Id. at 218.
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driving. Faced with the full moral force of the evidence, including the victim's
personal characteristics and the devastating effect the accident had on the
victim's family, the defendant might be induced to repent and be convinced
never to drive again while intoxicated. Victim participation in this case would
certainly help to reform the defendant; thus, this type of participation would be
permissible under the Indiana Constitution so long as it did not introduce a
retributive element. However, in a capital case where the prosecution is seeking
the death penalty, victim participation appears unlikely to have such an effect.
Remember the "Preppy Murder" case and the VIS discussed above. 7 ' Even
if the defendant repents, the most likely effect of the VIS is to convince the
sentencing body that the defendant deserves to be put to death.
Also, the victim may have a role in the implementation of an education or
treatment sentence." r  An obvious example would be a situation in which
counseling was required; in a case of domestic violence or child abuse,
successful rehabilitation apparently necessitates the participation of both the
victim and the offender." 3 This would not be the case in a capital proceeding
where cooperation between the victim and defendant is highly unlikely.
Thus, in a capital case, victim participation does not serve the goal of
reformation explicitly mandated by the Indiana Constitution. However, the
absence of a reformation objective is not necessarily fatal to a victim participa-
tion scheme. If it can be shown that victim participation serves one of the other
permissible sentencing goals-either deterrence or incapacitation-while not
being retributive or vindictive, its use may be valid under the Indiana Constitu-
tion.
Deterrence is based on the premise that punishment has the socially useful
function of preventing crime.'74  Generally, deterrence theory has two
171. See supra text accompanying note 165.
172. Id.
173. Henderson, supra note 5, at 990. She notes that in such situations it may be preferable
to have the offender remain with the family rather than sending the offender to jail. The
organization Parents United has had success in counseling both parties to child abuse. Id. at 990
n.248.
174. Henderson, supra note 5, at 987. Cesare Beccaria stated that for the betterment of society,
"[tihe degree of punishment, and the consequences of a crime, ought to be so contrived as to have
the greatest possible effect on others, with the least possible pain to the delinquent." Id. at n.234
(quoting CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 75 (1953)). Deterrence is
best associated with the utilitarians-including Beccaria and most notably Jeremy Bentham-whoalso
include incapacitation and reformation as permissible justifications for punishment so long as they
conform to the principle of utility. The principle of utility approves or disapproves of all actions
according to the tendency that the actions tend to augment or diminish the happiness of the individual
or society. BENTHAM, supra note 114, at 11-12. Thus, if incapacitation or reformation of offenders
augments the "happiness" of society, they are permissible. However, the utilitarians displayed no
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interrelated components; general deterrence, 75 where the punishment given for
a criminal act discourages others from engaging in the specific wrongdoing;176
and specific deterrence, where the punishment dissuades the wrongdoer from
engaging in any future wrongdoing.'" Punishment is valid if it is intended to
have a deterrent effect. However, punishment still remains an evil which may
only be inflicted if it "promises to exclude some greater evil."" T  Thus, in
some instances, punishment should not be inflicted at all. 79 When punishment
is necessary, only that punishment needed to prevent the bad act ought to be
inflicted. 0
At first glance, victim participation at sentencing may appear to further the
goal of deterrence. The victim's participation may help to increase the severity
of the sanction, thus ostensibly providing both a greater general and specific
deterrent to the commission of future acts. However, if the sanction is increased
because of the victim participation beyond what is proportional to the offense,
reservation in denouncing the retributive justification considering such to be inherently evil, base,
uncivilized and anti-utilitarian. Kantner, supra note 114, at 38.
175. Many critics point to rising crime rates as proof that deterrence is not working.
Henderson suggests that the rising crime rates may be more attributable to an increase in the
population of people at a crime-prone age than to anything else. Regardless of the reason, the rising
rates have certainly contributed to the rising popularity of the incapacitation and retribution theories.
Henderson, supra note 5, at 988 n.237.
176. PACKER, supra note 167. As another commentator has stated, "[lndividuals who are
tempted by a particular form of threatened behavior will . . . refrain from committing the offense
because the pleasure they might obtain is more than offset by the risk of great unpleasantness
communicated by a legal threat." FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 3 (1971).
This is a classic utilitarian analysis that sees humankind as being governed solely by pain and
pleasure. Thus, all rational persons will seek to maximize pleasure while minimizing their pain.
177. This theory is questioned by many who point out the high rates of recidivism among those
who have been punished for certain crimes. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 153, at 23. Bentham
might argue that in these cases, the punishment inflicted is not correctly proportioned to the offense.
The individual must be deriving more pleasure than pain from the commission of the bad act;
however, until the pain is greater than the pleasure, he will not stop committing the act.
178. BENTHAM, supra note 114, at 158. This is in direct contradiction with the retributive
justification, which sees punishment as an end in itself rather than as a means to an end. The end
desired by the deterrence theory is the controlling of action through punishment, such that the total
happiness of the community is augmented.
179. Bentham enumerates four circumstances in which punishment ought not be inflicted:
where it is groundless, there being no bad act to prevent; where it is inefficacious, and cannot
prevent the bad act; where it is unprofitable or expensive such that the evil done would be greater
than that prevented; and where it is needless and the bad act may be prevented or cease on its own
without it. BENTHAM, supra note 114, at 159.
180. Id. at 175. Bentham goes on to give 13 rules that should be followed to ensure that the
punishment is proportioned to the nature of the offense. See also BECCARIA, supra note 114, at 165-
72.
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the punishment becomes something other than a deterrent. 8 ' This punish-
ment, above what is required to deter the bad act, appears'to be both retributive
and vindictive-the punishment is applied merely because the person deserves
it and the victim requests it. Additionally, victim participation may result in
different punishments for the same offenses. In two different murder cases,
where victim evidence is presented in one but not the other, the two defendants
may receive different punishments for the same crime. This would violate the
utilitarian principle of equality in punishment." Because victim participation
may increase a punishment disproportionately or vary the sentences received for
similar sentences, it violates the principles of deterrence.
However, victim participation may serve the goal of deterrence, albeit
slightly, if victim participation increases cooperation between prosecutors and
victims in such a way that the certainty of punishment for an offense is
increased.8 3  Victims may have more incentive to cooperate with the
prosecution if they realize that they will have a role in determining the
disposition of the defendant, but the actual increase in certainty of punishment
is minimal. The victims must be allowed to cooperate in such a way that the
prosecutor, and the system as a whole, become more efficient; and the certainty
of punishment must be increased. " If victim participation increases the
certainty of the punishment, it is valid under the deterrent theory, so long as the
problems contrary to the deterrence theory discussed above are avoided.
181. This would violate Bentham's rule number five: "The punishment ought in no case to be
more than what is necessary to bring it into conformity with the rules here given." BENTHAM, supra
note 114, at 169. This may be true in a capital case in which it is impossible to show that the death
penalty is more of a deterrent than life imprisonment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 183, 184-85
(1976): "[Tlhe results have been inconclusive ... there is no convincing empirical evidence either
supporting or refuting the view [that] the death penalty may not function as a significantly greater
deterrent than lesser" punishments. The Court went on to say that where the murder is carefully
contemplated, such as murder for hire, the possible penalty of death may enter into the calculus
preceding the decision to act, but in other cases, such as acts of passion, death can be assumed to
have no deterrent effect. Id. See also JEREMY BENTHAM, JEREMY BENTHAM To His FELLOW
CITIZENS OF FRANCE, ON DEATH PUNISHMENT (London 1813) (quoted in Kantner, supra note 114
at 26-27). It is not enough to show that capital punishment serves the utilitarian function slightly
better than life imprisonment, rather it must serve this function significantly better. It must be
enough to make up for the added detriment to the defendant who receives death rather than life
imprisonment. Id.
182. Talbert, supra note 169, at 215. Bentham states that punishments may vary according to
the individual's sensibilities, that being the response an individual has to the form of punishment,
but that generally the punishment inflicted should correspond to the quantity intended for similar
offenders. BENTHAM, supra note 114, at 51, 169. He offers no argument that punishment should
be varied according to the wishes of the victim.
183. Bentham realized that wrongdoers would not be punished for all offenses and thus to make
up for any lack of certainty in punishment, the magnitude of the punishment should be increased.
BENTHAM, supra note 114, at 170. Thus, any increase in certainty would be an added deterrent.
184. Talbert, supra note 169, at 216.
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Under the theory of incapacitation-the idea that society may protect itself
from persons who are found to be dangerous by isolating them from society" 5
-the person deciding the sentence must determine the future dangerousness
6
of the criminal I" before deciding on whether he should be incapacitated.
Proponents of victim participation assert that the victim's testimony would assist
the sentencing court in making the assessment of future dangerousness. "
This argument is invalid, however, because the relationship between the future
dangerousness of the offender and the offense is tenuous at best.' 89 The
factors that must be examined in determining whether or not an offender should
be incapacitated are related to the personal characteristics of the offender, and
not those of the victim."9  Thus, as the inclusion of the victim at the
sentencing hearing would not help to predict the future dangerousness of the
victim, it does nothing to assist the trier of fact in determining who should be
incapacitated.' 9' Hence, incapacitation may not be advanced as the justifica-
tion for victim participation.
With the exception that victim participation may further deterrence by
increasing the certainty of punishment, the inclusion of the victim does not
further any of the permissible goals under the Indiana Constitution. Neither
reformation, deterrence, nor incapacitation is furthered by allowing the victim
to testify at the sentencing hearing. Coupled with the fact that victim participa-
tion includes an element of retribution, present Indiana practices cannot be
justified under section 18. Alternatives must be sought if Indiana wishes to
provide for the rights of the victims while at the same time protecting the
defendants' rights guaranteed by the Indiana Constitution.
185. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 153, at 23. LaFave and Scott note that it has also been
suggested that society has the right to isolate not only those persons identified by their past criminal
conduct, but anyone who can be conclusively shown to be a danger to society.
186. The ability of anyone to accurately predict the future dangerousness of any offender is
suspect, according to some critics. See Henderson, supra note 5, at 973 n. 183.
187. Such factors may include a prior criminal record, a history of alcohol and drug abuse, and
a documented inability to secure a job. James B. Wilson, Dealing With the High-Rate Offender, 72
PUB. INTEREST 52, 62-63, 65 (1983).
188. See, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 77 (noting that "[a] judge cannot reach an
informed determination of the danger posed by a defendant without hearing from the person he has
victimized").
189. Henderson, supra note 5, at 989. See also Wilson, supra note 187, at 61-63 (stating that
the nature of the present offense is not an accurate predictor of who is a high-rate offender).
190. Henderson, supra note 5, at 989-90.
191. In some situations, the victim might be able to help the sentencer predict the future
dangerousness of the offender. If the victim knew the offender well, information regarding the
offender's lifestyle and past activities might be helpful to the court. However, in most cases, the
victim will be in no better position to testify as to the defendant's personal characteristics than any
others. Talbert, supra note 169, at 217. This is irrelevant at the sentencing phase of a capital case,
however; because guilt has already been determined, the defendant is faced with only two sentences
by which he will be incapacitated totally.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 3 [1993], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol27/iss3/8
1993] VICTIM PARTICIPATION 767
V. CONCLUSION: THE INDIANA CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS THE
PRESENT VIS AND VSO STATUTES
The Indiana Constitution prohibits statutes based on retribution. The plain
language of section 18 mandates that the penal code be founded on the principles
of reformation and that individual statutes may be valid if based on either
deterrence or incapacitation. An examination of the intent of the framers and
the early judicial interpretation of section 18 bolsters this conclusion. Thus, a
statute founded on the impermissible goal of retribution, and not on the
permissible goals of reformation, deterrence, or incapacitation, is unconstitution-
al.
Victim participation is based primarily on the forbidden foundation of
retribution. Even absent retribution, victim participation statutes do not advance
any of the constitutionally acceptable goals under section 18. Thus, victim
participation statutes are unconstitutional.
The Indiana Supreme Court has not been faced with the argument that
victim participation in the sentencing phase of a capital case is violative of
section 18. However, if presented with evidence that victim participation is
based primarily on retribution-and does nothing to further the goals embodied
in section 18-the court has the unequivocal duty of finding the inclusion of the
victim in the sentencing determination to be unconstitutional. Any other
decision would allow for the continued violation of the defendants' rights as
guaranteed by the Indiana Constitution.
Edward F. Harney, Jr.
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